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GUBERNATORIAL REMOVAL
AND STATE SUPREME COURTS
William E. Raftery*
I. INTRODUCTION

Recent events in Illinois have drawn attention to a question
that had lain relatively dormant for several decades: For what
cause other than an impeachable offense may a governor be
removed, and by whom? Ratification of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution-providing an
orderly process for removal of a president "unable to discharge
the powers and duties" of the office-ignited that discussion
among the states fifty years ago,' but for half of the states, the
power either to make the determination of incapacity or to
review the determination made by another group has been
constitutionally or statutorily vested in the state's highest court
or its chief justice. This article provides an overview of that little
used and often overlooked power of the state supreme courts.
II. REGENCY,

INCAPACITY, AND COURTS

The question of the incapacity of state executives or their
inability to discharge their duties predates the ratification of the
Constitution, and can be traced directly to questions about

* KIS Communications and Research Specialist, National Center for State Courts. Mr.
Raftery can be reached at wraftery@ncsc.org or 757-259-1811.
1. See U.S. Const. amend. XXV, § 4 (providing that "[w]henever the Vice President
and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President"),
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colonial-era governorshipS2 and regency in the United Kingdom.
The records of the Committee on the Executive Department at
the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, for example,
show a direct tie to the practice in then-current and former
British colonies:
[T]he Committee considered with great care . . . the

ascertainment of disability, which under the Constitution
causes a succession in the power of the office of Governor.
Governors, unfortunately, are subject to all the ills that
flesh it [sic] heir to. We might have the case of an
executive of unsound mind, declaring that he was of sound
mind, exercising the powers of this great office, and no
constitutional machinery or legal machinery provided, by
which he could be legally declared incompetent and put out
of office. So tremendous are the consequences in a change
of executive power in all governments, that legislators and
statesmen have hesitated to frame the details by which
disability shall be ascertained and enforced in all cases; but
it is the common practice in some countries, where the king
or monarch becomes insane, for the Privy Council
sometimes calling in the heir, to consult about it, and
finally referred it to the government like parliament which
is omnipotent, and thereupon parliament declares a
regency.
Alabama's modification to regency was the movement
away from ad hoc procedures that were implemented on a
sovereign-by-sovereign basis and instead a movement toward
the use of a permanent institution, the Supreme Court, to serve

2. See Richard H. Hansen, Executive Disability:A Void in State and FederalLaw, 40
Neb. L. Rev. 697, 700 (1961) (noting that the extent to which the federal provisions were
based on colonial charters and the early state constitutions "has never been thoroughly
considered," citing Irving G. Williams, The Rise of the Vice Presidency 16 (Pub. Affairs
Press 1956), and noting that Williams considers "the colonial experience .. . with reference
to secondary sources"). Hansen was of course writing before Amendment 25 to the federal
constitution, which provides for succession in the case of presidential disability or
incapacity, was ratified in 1967.
3. Official Proceedingsof the ConstitutionalConvention of the State ofAlabama, May
21, 1901, to Sept. 3, 1901, vol. 1, at 482, http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/
constitutions/190 1/proceedings/1901 _proceedings_vol /day 17.html (accessed June 30,
2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter Official
Proceedings].
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as the determining body.4 The United Kingdom itself would not
reach such a level of consistency until the Regency Act 1937
named five specific officials, any three of whom could declare
in writing the sovereign's incapacity.5 Here in the United States,
the late 1800s and early 1900s brought several proceedings that
compelled state high courts to determine the proper holders of
governors' offices. 6 Even the United States Supreme Court
4. See id. (asserting that "[tihe Committee can conceive of no safer body, no more
august body, no body less liable to temptation to use the power for political gain or any
other improper motive, than the Supreme Court of Alabama," and advising the convention
that "[t]he further safeguard was provided, in case of the unsoundness of mind of the
Governor, that the Supreme Court should not take cognizance of it, unless that question
was brought before that body by some officer not next in the succession").
5. 1 Edw 8 & 1 Geo 6 c 16 (providing in section 2(1) that "the following persons or
any three or more of them, that is to say, the wife or husband of the Sovereign, the Lord
Chancellor, the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Lord Chief Justice of England, and
the Master of the Rolls" may "declare in writing that they are satisfied by evidence which
shall include the evidence of physicians that the Sovereign is by reason of infirmity of
mind or body incapable for the time being of performing the royal functions or that they
are satisfied by evidence that the Sovereign is for some definite cause not available for the
performance of those functions" and so institute a Regency during which the duties of the
Sovereign "shall be performed in the name and on behalf of the Sovereign by a Regent");
see also C. d'O. Farran, The Law of the Accession 16 Modem L. Rev. 140, 143 (1953)

(pointing out that the Act "directs a regency where 'the Sovereign is for some definite
cause not available for the performance of (the royal) functions"'). It should be noted that
the disability or unavailability proceedings discussed here are separate and distinct from
quo warranto actions. In the latter sort of proceeding, the question rests on whether the
individual is a "usurper," exercising the powers of an office that he or she does not
properly hold. See generally e.g. Logan Scott Stafford, Judicial Coup d'Etat: Mandamus,
Quo Warranto and the OriginalJurisdictionof the Supreme Court ofArkansas, 20 U. Ark.

L. Rock L.J. 891 (1998).
6. See State ex rel. Moore v. Blake, 142 So. 418, 419 (Ala. 1932) ("If the incumbent

becomes ineligible to hold the office pending his incumbency, and continues to exercise its
functions, he is a usurper, and may be ousted by quo warranto proceedings."); see also
State ex rel. Sathre v. Moodie 258 N.W. 558 (N.D. 1935) (quo warranto proceeding in
which recently elected lieutenant governor was found to be appropriate holder of the office
of governor when recently elected governor was found to be ineligible for the office
because of failure to meet residency requirements); State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N.W.
377 (N.D. 1934) (governor's conviction for a felony made him ineligible to remain in
office under a provision of the state's constitution requiring governors to be electors in the
state); State ex rel. Morris v. Bulkeley, 23 A. 186 (Conn. 1892) (dismissing proceeding
although trial court and Supreme Court of Connecticut had jurisdiction in quo warranto
action where General Assembly refused to count the votes for governor and a candidate
merely claimed he "appeared" to be governor but did not actually try to exercise the
powers of office); Attorney-General v. Taggart, 29 A. 1027 (N.H. 1890) (holding that
where there are two claimants for the office of governor, the courts may determine who
properly holds the office via quo waranto); Attorney Gen. ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4
Wis. 567 (1855) (similar); but see State ex rel. Cyr v. Long, 140 So. 13 (La. 1932)

(declining to consider intrusion-into-office claim when governor, having been elected a
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became involved in Nebraska's Thayer/Boyd controversy,
eventually overruling the state Supreme Court's holding for
Thayer.
Nor was the Blagojevich corruption scandal of 2008 the
first time Illinois was faced with a question of gubernatorial
disability.8 Governor Henry Homer suffered from a long illness
associated with a 1938 heart attack, making it an open question
as to whether he could in fact serve as governor. A series of
legal issues arose, including most importantly whether the
lieutenant governor could unilaterally declare himself acting
governor. A number of proceedings, including quo warranto,
were threatened in order to force a judicial determination. The
speaker of the Illinois House suggested that the state's auditor
ignore the governor's signature on requests for his salary,
forcing Homer into court for a mandamus proceeding against
the auditor. No judicial decision was ever issued, however,
because Homer's death mooted the judicial proceedings.
A decade later, the question of judicial involvement in
declaring a governor incapacitated occurred in Louisiana where,
in 1959, Governor Earl K. Long was forcibly committed to a
state mental hospital. His attorneys filed a habeas proceeding,
contending that by being committed he was being
unconstitutionally removed from office. Whereas in Illinois the
lieutenant governor sought to be named-and contended that he
was-acting governor, Louisiana's lieutenant governor was
vociferous in claiming he was not governor, acting or otherwise,
despite an attorney general's opinion to the contrary. A mere
hour prior to a judicial hearing on the habeas petition, Governor
Long was released from the mental institution when his political

United States senator, continued using powers of governorship by appointing new
lieutenant governor); Taylor v. Beckham, 56 S.W. 177 (Ky. 1900) (indicating that courts
have no power to review results of duly held election for governor); State v. Baxter, 28
Ark. 129 (1873) (indicating that court had no power to grant writ of quo warranto
regarding office of governor as state's constitution vested power to answer such questions
exclusively in the legislature).
7. State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, 48 N.W. 739 (Neb. 1891), rev'd sub nom Boyd v.

Neb., 143 U.S. 135 (1891). For a detailed description of the case and surrounding events,
see Louise Charlotte Wilke, Student Author, Constitutional Law-Disability of Chief
Executive-How to Determine, 22 Neb. L. Rev. 20 (1943).
8. See generally Clyde F. Snider, Gubernatorial Disability, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 521

(1941).
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allies dismissed the state's director of hospitals and immediately
forced the successor to sign the release order.9
III. MODERN PRACTICE
In both the Illinois and Louisiana instances, the question
was placed squarely into the hands of a trial judge. In the
subsequent decades, states have separated the concept into two
components. In the first, trial judges are still capable of
declaring people mentally incapacitated and ordering their
confinement under various mental health laws. In some cases,
this is explicit, as in Alabama's statute'o that declares vacated
the office of anyone "adjudged" by the probate courts "to be of
unsound mind." The probate judge may at any time then return
the person to office by revoking or annulling the order. These
powers function as an extension of the trial courts' wellestablished power to exercise jurisdiction over the incompetent
within their civil jurisdiction. But in the second iteration of the
power to remove a governor, the question of incapacity is more
a political one that requires the engagement of at least one, and
in many states both, of the other branches of government."
Moreover, the voting threshold required to support a disability
removal can vary from explicitly unanimous to ambiguously
majority-rule. Table 1 summarizes these voting requirements.
Table 1
Vote Required to Remove Governor
2

MI, MS, MO, UT

Majority Vote Explicitly Required

CO, LA, ME,

Majority Vote Implicitly Required

AL, CA, FL, GA, IL, IN, IA, ME," MD,
NH, NJ, OH, OK, SD

9. See generally Neil. F. Garvey, The Amenability of the Governor to Court
Processes, 7 How. L.J. 120, 125 (1961).

10. Ala. Code § 36-9-3 (LEXIS 2010).
11. For details of similar provisions that exclude the courts, see Calvin Bellamy,
PresidentialDisability: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment Still an Untried Tool, 9 B.U. Pub.

Int. L.J. 373, 386-90 (2000) (including a helpful table).
12. When suggested by the secretary of state.
13. When suggested by the legislature.
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Table 1 (continued)
Vote Required to Remove Governor
Unanimous Vote Explicitly Required

DE, IA, KY (commission chaired by
Chief Justice)

Supermajority Vote Explicitly Required

CT (2/3 of council chaired by Chief
Justice), MA (Chief Justice and majority
of Associate Justices), MN (four of five
named persons), OR (four members of
five-member panel chaired by Chief
Justice)14

A. Executive-Branch Suggestion
Similar to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, most state
constitutions that provide a specific role for a state supreme
court in gubernatorial removal rely on other executive branch
officers to make the initial "suggestion" of incapacity, leaving
the court tasked with making the actual determination that
removes the governor. But two state constitutional provisions
dealing with gubernatorial incapacity and the courts pre-date the
1965 submission of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the states.
Mississippi's 1890 constitution permits the secretary of
state to submit to its supreme court the question of whether the
office of governor is vacant due to the governor's disability or
absence from the state.15 In addition to being the oldest
provision to include a state supreme court as part of the
disability determination, this section has the distinction of being
one of the few provisions whose scope and meaning have been
litigated. In 1927, a state senator serving as acting lieutenant
governor requested through the secretary of state a
14. Oregon's practice changed in 2009 from a commission form to a panel form.
15. Miss. Const. art V. §131 (LEXIS 2009) (providing that "[s]hould a doubt arise as to
whether a vacancy has occurred in the office of Governor or as to whether any one of the
disabilities mentioned in this section exists or shall have ended, then the Secretary of State
shall submit the question in doubt to the judges of the Supreme Court, who, or a majority
of whom, shall investigate and determine the question and shall furnish to the Secretary of
State an opinion, in writing, determining the question submitted to them, which opinion,
when rendered as aforesaid, shall be final and conclusive").

GUBERNATORIAL REMOVAL AND STATE SUPREME COURTS

171

determination by the Mississippi Supreme Court as to whether
he remained acting lieutenant governor, given that a recent
election had resulted in a lieutenant governor-elect. The court
held that its power was limited to determinations as to who held
the office of governor.' 6 In a letter to the acting secretary of
state, the court noted that
[t]he information here sought by you relates not to the
discharge by [the senator] of the duties of Governor, but to
the discharge by him of the duties of Lieutenant Governor,
and, consequently, is not within the authority conferred
17
upon us to answer questions propounded to us by you.
Alabama's 1911 constitution permits any two of the seven
executive branch officers in line for succession' 8 (unless they
are in the particular situation themselves immediately next in
line for succession), to submit affidavits to the Supreme Court,
asking it to determine whether the governor is of "unsound
mind."l 9 Recent proposals to expand the review to include
physical disabilities have failed to progress.20
Similarly, Georgia's 1976 constitution relies on any four of
the state's seven other "elected constitutional executive
officers" 2 1 to petition the state's supreme court. 22 Kentucky's
16. In re Opinion ofJustices, 114 So. 887 (Miss. 1927).
17. Id. at 888.

18. In order of succession, these are lieutenant governor, president pro tempore of the
senate, speaker of the house of representatives, attorney general, state auditor, secretary of
state, and state treasurer. Ala. Const. § 127; see also Official Proceedings, supra n. 3, at
482 (noting that the committee of the constitutional convention charged with drafting the
provisions for succession "provided in this article not only for the case of the death of the
Lieutenant Governor, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, but we have added
to the offices who shall succeed to the Governorship, the Attorney General, Secretary of
State, State Treasurer and State Auditor")
19. Ala. Const. art. V, § 128 (LEXIS 2010). Thus, the lieutenant governor could never
be among the two officers submitting affidavits, because should the Supreme Court find
that the governor suffers from an "unsound mind," the lieutenant governor would be first in
line to succeed to the office of governor.
20. See William H. Stewart, Possible Changes in the Alabama Executive Branch:
Points For Consideration By the Citizens' Constitutional Commission, 33 Cumb. L. Rev.

297, 312 (2002) (indicating that a new state constitution proposed in 1979 had included
such a provision).
21. The other executive officers are the lieutenant governor, the secretary of state, the
attorney general, the state school superintendent, the commissioner of insurance, the
commissioner of agriculture, and the commissioner of labor. Ga. Const. art. V, § IV para. I
(LEXIS 2009).
22. Ga. Const. art. V, § IV para. II (LEXIS 2009).
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constitution, as amended in 1992, empowers a unanimous
supreme court to remove the governor based on a petition

alleging gubernatorial disability filed by the attorney general.23
All three members of Florida's cabinet are required to submit
their suggestion of the governor's "incapacity" to that state's
supreme court for determination.2 4
New Hampshire's 1984 constitutional amendment is unique
in its specificity with respect to evidentiary standards for the
courts and the executive branch officers. When it "reasonably
appears" to the state's attorney general and a majority of the
five-member Council both that the governor is suffering from a
physical or mental incapacity and that the governor is unwilling
or unable to agree with that determination, the attorney general
may file a petition for declaratory judgment with the state's
supreme court. The court must then decide, using a
preponderance of the evidence standard, whether the evidence
associated with the petition supports removal of the governor.
The governor may petition the court and be restored to office if
the court, again specifically using a preponderance of the
evidence standard, finds the governor able to discharge the
duties of the office. However, there is a time limit: If the
governor's disability remains for longer than six months after
the initial judgment by the court, the legislature may declare the
office permanently vacant. 2 5

Maine operates in a similar fashion under a provision added
to its constitution in 1975.26 Relating to temporary removal of
the governor, it requires only that the secretary of state have
"reason to believe" that the governor is unable to discharge the
duties of office. Upon the secretary of state's certifying that
reason to the Supreme Judicial Court, a hearing is held and a
simple majority vote of the court is required to remove the
governor.

23. Ky. Const.

§ 84 (LEXIS 2009).

24. Fla. Const. art. IV, § 3 (LEXIS 2010).
25. N.H. Const. art. 49-a (LEXIS 2010).
26. Me. Const. art. V, part I § 15 (LEXIS 2009).
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B. Legislative Suggestion
1. Legislative Action
Maine's second method of permanent gubernatorial
removal is similar to that of many other states in that the
legislature makes the initial suggestion of incapacity.2 7 If the
governor is be incapacitated for at least six months, the
legislature, meeting in convention, may adopt a joint resolution
by a two-thirds vote to have the matter sent to the Supreme
Judicial Court. After a hearing, a simple majority of the court
may find that grounds exist to declare the office permanently
vacant.
Maryland's 1970 constitutional amendment 2 8 too requires a
supermajority (three-fifths) of the legislature in joint session to
adopt a resolution declaring the governor unable to perform the
duties of the office. If adopted, the resolution is delivered to the
Court of Appeals (the state's highest court), which determines
whether the governor is permanently unable to discharge the
office, yielding a vacancy. If the court instead finds the
incapacity to be temporary, it retains jurisdiction to determine
when the governor may resume office, although it is not
specified if the court may act sua sponte or must await a request
from the governor.
Colorado's constitution2 9 allows two-thirds of all members
of the General Assembly to submit to the Supreme Court a joint
request that the court conduct a hearing as to the physical or
mental disability of the governor or governor-elect. The court's
determination is "final and conclusive" and the court alone,
''upon its own initiative" determines when the disability has
ceased .30
Ohio's 1976 constitutional amendment 3 1 states that a joint
resolution of the legislature passed by two-thirds of each house
may declare a governor unable to discharge the office, with the
resolution to be presented to the Supreme Court, which has
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at § 14.
Md. Const. art. II, § 6(c) (LEXIS 2010).
Colo. Const. art. IV, § 13(6) (LEXIS 2009).
Id.
Ohio Const. art. III, §22 (LEXIS 2010).
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"original, exclusive, and final jurisdiction to determine [the]
disability of the governor." 32 The court has twenty-one days
after presentment of the resolution to hold hearings and make a
determination. If removed, the governor may request
reinstatement by declaration to the Court, which must conduct
another hearing and render a decision, again within twenty-one

days. 33
A 2006 amendment to New Jersey's constitution 34 allows
the legislature by two-thirds vote to suggest that the governor
suffers from a mental or physical disability and that the office is
vacant. The actual determination of vacancy rests with the
Supreme Court, which must give notice to the governor and
conduct a hearing at which the legislature must provide proof of
the existence of the vacancy.
2. Action by Legislative Leaders
A second formulation requires legislative leaders, rather
than the legislature as a whole, to suggest that the high court
remove the governor. Michigan's 1963 constitution 35
demonstrates this in its simplest form. While substantially vague
in terms of the court's process and procedures in removal, it
does state that a person's inability to continue to serve as
governor is to be determined by a majority of the Supreme Court
when the president pro tempore of the Senate and the speaker of
the House of Representatives jointly request that the court make
such a determination. While the Court's determination "shall be
final and conclusive," the Court on its own initiative alone may
determine if and when the governor may resume office. Similar
but more detailed is a 1979 amendment to the Utah
constitution36 providing that a disability can be determined by a
majority of the Supreme Court on the joint request of the
president of the Senate and the speaker of the House of
Representatives. The governor can then resume office by filing a
declaration with the Supreme Court, but the Court can reject the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
N.J. Cont. art. V, §lI 8 (LEXIS 2010).
Mich. Const. art. V, § 26 (6)(a)(ii) (LEXIS 2010).
Utah Const. art. VII, §ll (LEXIS 2009).
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declaration either on the joint request of the senate president and
house speaker or the Court itself "upon its own initiative." 37
Of particular note is a 1978 amendment to the Indiana
constitution3 8 that added a provision very similar to the TwentyFifth Amendment, with the initial suggestion of inability to be
made to the Indiana Supreme Court by the president pro tempore
of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives. It
is very detailed in its description of the Supreme Court's
processes and procedures. The court is required to meet within
forty-eight hours after the suggestion and make its
determination. A governor so removed may reclaim the office
with a letter to the Supreme Court declaring his or her ability to
serve, which must again make a determination within forty-eight
hours. Indiana's provision appears to be the only such
mechanism by which a court-directed removal has ever
occurred. On September 8, 2003, Governor Frank O'Bannon
suffered a stroke. Two days later, the president pro tempore and
speaker submitted a letter to the Supreme Court suggesting that
the governor was unable to fulfill his duties, a sentiment
concurred in by both the governor's counsel and his family. That
same day, the Court found him unable to discharge his powers
as of September 8, 2003, at 9:30 a.m., and "ratified" all the
actions of the lieutenant governor from that moment to the
issuance of the decision. 39 O'Bannon never attempted to resume
office, as he died on September 13.40
V. OTHER MECHANISMS

1. State Supreme Courtas Appellate Court
Oklahoma makes use of a statutory process in which the
court of last resort functions more as an appellate court
reviewing the determination of a lower tribunal rather than as an
37. Utah Const. art. VII § 11(6)(b) (LEXIS 2009). Note that an amendment to the Utah
constitution effective January 2009 slightly alters the original procedure, expanding it to
allow an "acting" Senate president or "acting" House speaker to make the joint request.
38. Ind. Const. art. 5, § 10(d) (LEXIS 2010).
39. In re O'Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 838, 838 (Ind. 2003).
40. Monica Davey, Indiana Governor's Death Leaves Ally in Command, 153 N.Y.

Times A31 (Sept. 14, 2003).
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initial or primary determiner of incapacity, in a process that
involves all three branches. 4 11f a committee consisting of five
executive-branch officials42 declares the governor unable to
discharge the duties of office, the office devolves to the
lieutenant governor. Should the governor contest the
committee's determination, and should the committee continue
to insist on the inability, the legislature is required to meet
within seventy-two hours and adopt by a two-thirds majority a
resolution that "probable justification" exists to conclude that an
inability exists. The resolution is then forwarded to the Supreme
Court which, under such rules as it may adopt, must hear the
matter, placing the resolution above all other matters on its
docket. Interestingly, while the committee alone may remove the
governor (the legislature and Supreme Court become involved
only if the governor contests the removal), the committee and
the Supreme Court must concur to restore the governor to office
once the inability has been removed.4 3
Louisiana's process functions similarly,4 with the initial
determination of disability made by a majority of the state's six
statewide elected officials 45 and the governor temporarily
removed after their finding. If the governor contests this finding,
41. Okla. Stat. Ann. title 74, ch. 1, § 8(C), (D) (LEXIS 2010).
42. The officials named are the state auditor and inspector, state treasurer, state
superintendent of public instruction, chairman of the Corporation Commission, and
insurance commissioner. Okla. Stat. Ann. title 74, ch. 1, § 8(B) (LEXIS 2010).
43. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, ch. 1, § 8(B) (LEXIS 2010).
44. La. Const. art. IV, §18 (LEXIS 2009).
45. The list includes the lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general,
treasurer, commissioner of agriculture, and commissioner of insurance. See La. Const. Art.
IV, §3(A) (LEXIS 2010) (providing, that "the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of
state, attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture, commissioner of insurance,
superintendent of education, and commissioner of elections each shall be elected for a term
of four years by the electors of the state"); La. Rev. Stat. §17:21(C) (LEXIS 2010)
(providing, pursuant to La. Const. Art. IV § 20, that superintendant of education "shall be
appointed by a two-thirds vote of the total membership of the State Board of Elementary
and Secondary Education," thus removing him or her from the category of statewide
elected officials empowered to determine gubernatorial disability); La. Rev. Stat. § 18:18
(LEXIS 2010) (providing, pursuant to La. Const. Art. IV § 20, that commissioner of
elections "shall be appointed by the secretary of state subject to Senate confirmation," thus
removing him or her from the category of statewide elected officials empowered to
determine gubernatorial disability); see also http://www.sos.louisiana.gov/Portals/O/
elections/pdf/Gub_-Summaryrev_10-07.pdf(listing statewide executive offices to be filled
in 2011 elections) (accessed Aug. 24, 2010; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).
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the legislature then must pass a resolution by two thirds finding
"probable justification for the determination that inability
exists." That resolution is then sent to the Supreme Court, which
must put all other matters aside and render a decision after due
notice and a hearing by a simple majority of "members elected
to the court" under whatever rules the court may provide.4 6 The
Court may then review its determination either on request or on
its own motion, with a majority required to return the governor
to office.4 7
A 1968 amendment to Missouri's constitution 48 creates a
process similar to that in Louisiana, but one that bypasses the
legislature. The relevant provision names the state's nine top
elected officials other than the governor as "a disability board,"
a majority of whose members may find the governor unable to
discharge the duties of office. 49 Once the board makes the
determination, the governor is temporarily removed from office
and must transmit a letter to the disability board declaring no
inability exists. If a majority of the board continues to believe
that the governor is unable, it may forward a declaration to that
effect to the Supreme Court. The court then has twenty-one days
to deliberate and by majority vote may find either that the
disability continues or return the governor to office.
California's constitution5 0 specifies that a lieutenant
governor acts as governor when the current occupant of that
office suffers from a temporary disability and that, while the
Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all
questions arising under the section, "[s]tanding to raise
questions of vacancy or temporary disability is vested
exclusively in a body provided by statute." 5 By majority vote,
46. La. Const. art. IV § 18(D) (LEXIS 2010).
47. La. Const. art. IV § 18(E) (LEXIS 2010).
48. Mo. Const. art. IV, § 11(b) (LEXIS 2009).
49. The members of the group are the lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state
auditor, state treasurer, attorney general, president pro tempore of the Senate, speaker of
the House of Representatives, majority floor leader of the Senate, and majority floor leader
of the House. Id.
50. Cal. Const. art. 5, §10 (LEXIS 2010).
51. Id. The statutorily created body is the Commission on the Governorship, which
consists of the president pro tempore of the Senate, the speaker of the Assembly, the
president of the University of California, the chancellor of the California State Colleges,
and the director of finance. Cal. Gov. Code §12070 (LEXIS 2010).
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the Commission on the Governorship may petition the court
regarding the existence of questions as to succession and
vacancy in the office of governor, the governor's temporary
disability, and the termination of the governor's disability. 2 The
Commission became a litigant in In Re Commission on the
Governorship,53 when Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb used
Governor Edmund G. Brown's 1979 absence from the state to
make a judicial appointment. The governor, on returning,
revoked the appointment. The chief justice, as chair of the
Commission on Judicial Appointments (to whom Curb sent his
appointment letter) asked the Commission on the Governorship
if it intended to file suit over the matter, which the Commission
subsequently did. The Court majority first examined whether the
Commission on the Governorship had standing and concluded
that it did. 54 Focusing on the definition of "absence from the
State," the Court held that while the governor was "absent," and
thus the appointment by the lieutenant governor valid, the
governor, on his return and prior to the point at which the
appointment was "confirmed," could revoke it at will.5 5 A
concurring opinion agreed that the Commission on the Governor
had standing to sue and that the appointment was properly
revoked, but argued that "absence" meant "effective absence"
from the state and that with modern technologies a governor a
continent away was capable of acting effectively for the state
and its interests.5 6
2. Specially DesignatedPanelor Commission
A final process relies on the chief justice to preside over a
panel or commission specifically designated to examine the

52. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12072, 12073, 12075 (LEXIS 2010).
53. 603 P.2d 1357 (Cal. 1979). For a full discussion of the case see David B. Lloyd,
Student Author, In Re Governorship: Curbing Mike Curb-Constitutionally,7 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 831 (1980).
54. Commn. on the Governorship, 603 P.2d at 115.
55. Id. at 122 ("[W]e conclude that Governor Brown's withdrawal of the . . .
appointment was valid").
56. Id. at 123-24.
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capacity of the governor.5 7 Delaware's constitution grants the

chief justice, acting unanimously with the president of the
Medical Society of Delaware and the commissioner of the
Department of Mental Health, the power to remove the governor
upon their declaration that he or she is suffering from a
disability." If the governor contests this determination, the
matter is submitted to the General Assembly, which must muster
a two-thirds vote of all members in order to sustain the
determination of disability. 59 Connecticut's constitution 60 creates
a similar Council on Gubernatorial Incapacity, which by
statute61 consists of the chief justice presiding over a body
consisting of the president pro tempore of the Senate, the
speaker of the House of Representatives, the House and Senate
minority leaders, and four persons selected by the governor.
Upon receipt of a suggestion of incapacity by the lieutenant
governor or a majority of Council itself, a two-thirds vote of the
Council is required to temporarily remove the governor from
power.623

Iowa's commission6 3 consists of the chief justice, the
director of mental health, and the dean of medicine at the State
University of Iowa. The chief justice, or the person next in line
for gubernatorial succession, calls the three together to "examine
the governor" and within seven days of the examination or their
attempt to do so (presumably if the governor does not
cooperate), the three must then vote by secret ballot whether to
find the governor temporarily unable to discharge the office. A
unanimous vote is required either to find that the disability exists
or to remove it.6
Minnesota by statute creates a group of five individuals
who may, upon the concurrence of four of the members,
57. For instances of state panels that do not involve the chief justice or the Supreme
Court specifically, see Bellamy, supra n. 11, at 391-92. A detailed discussion of the
workings of those panels is beyond the scope of this article.
58. Del. Const. art. III, §20(b) (LEXIS 2010).
59. Id.
60. Conn. Const. Amend., art. XXII (LEXIS 2009) (amending section 18 of the
Connecticut constitution to include a subsection establishing the Commission).
61. Conn. Gen. Stat. 3-la (LEXIS 2009).
62. Id.
63. Iowa Code § 7.14(1) (LEXIS 2009).
64. Iowa Code § 7.14(1), (3).
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temporarily remove the governor.65 The declaration signed by
the four remains in effect until four of the five rescind it or the
governor contests it and the legislature, which must meet with
forty-eight hours of the challenge, finds by two-thirds vote that
the governor remains unable to discharge the powers and duties

of office. 6 6
Of particular note is the post-Blagojevich activity in
Oregon. Prior to 2009, the state's statutes were nearly identical
to Minnesota's. The person next in line to succession for the
governorship or the chief justice would call together the chief
justice, the chief medical officer of the state hospital in Salem,
and the head of the Oregon Health and Science University to
"examine the governor" and vote by unanimous secret ballot
their finding of temporary inability.6 7 In 2009, however, the
legislature created a five-member "disability evaluation panel"
chaired by the chief justice. The governor selects two members
(a judge of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, plus a
licensed physician), the dean of the Oregon Health and Science
University School of Medicine selects one (a physician), and the
Director of Human Services also selects one (a physician). 68 The
physicians selected by the Director and dean are required "[t]o
the extent possible" to have "the appropriate expertise to
determine whether the Governor is suffering from a physical or
mental disability that prevents the Governor from discharging
the duties of the office." 69 When two of five designated state
officials (none of whom is a member of the disability evaluation
panel) request it, the panel must convene.70 The panel must
examine the governor, and the physicians on the panel must

65. Minn. Stat. 4.06(d) (LEXIS 2009). The five members of the Council are the chief
justice, the lieutenant governor, the governor's chief of staff, the governor's personal
physician, and a pre-designated member of the governor's Cabinet. If the governor has not
designated a Cabinet member, three of the remaining four members of the Council are
required.
66. Minn. Stat. 4.06(e) (LEXIS 2009).
67. See Ore. Rev. Stat. § 176.040 (LEXIS 2007). Note that this section has now been
superseded by Ore. Rev. Stat. § 176.303 (LEXIS 2010).
68. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 176.303(1) (LEXIS 2009).
69. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 176.303(1)(d), (e).
70. The five are the secretary of state, the state treasurer, the president of the Senate,
the speaker of the House, and the governor's chief of staff. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 176.306
(LEXIS 2009).
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explicitly conduct a medical examination, "if possible". 7' A vote
of four of the five panel members is sufficient to find the
governor "unable to discharge the duties of the office"; however,
the votes of only three members are required to return the
governor to office.7 2
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITIES

Illinois's 1970 constitution 73 granted the general assembly
the power to specify the person or persons able to suggest the
existence of gubernatorial disability; set out the procedure by
which to determine the disability; and specified that the
Supreme Court could make the initial and subsequent
determinations of disability. The Supreme Court's roles were
twofold: to have original and exclusive jurisdiction to review the
gubernatorial disability statute passed by the General Assembly,
and, should the legislature not pass such a law, to make the
disability determination under such rules as the court would
adopt.7 4 But the General Assembly never passed such a law.
A similar set of circumstances appears in Massachusetts,
where a 1968 amendment to that state's constitution provides
that a majority of the state's highest court or a separate body
established by the state legislature and charged with determining
the
necessary
disability
may
make
gubernatorial
determination. No such body has ever been provided for in a
legislative enactment. Instead, when the chief justice and a
majority of the associate justices of the Supreme Judicial Court
transmit a declaration to the Senate president and House speaker
expressing their belief that the governor is unable to discharge
the duties of the office, the governor is removed. The governor
71. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 176.309 (LEXIS 2009).
72. Compare Ore. Rev. Stat. § 176.312(1) (LEXIS 2009) ("A disability evaluation
panel shall find that the Governor is unable to discharge the duties of the office if four or
more members of the panel vote in the affirmative for that finding.") with Ore. Rev. Stat. §
176.312(3) (LEXIS 2009) ("The examination shall be conducted in the manner provided by
ORS 176.309, except that the panel shall find that the Governor is able again to discharge
the duties of the office if three or more members of the panel vote in the affirmative for
that finding.").
73. Ill. Const. art. V, §6(d) (LEXIS 2010).
74. Id.
75. Mass. Const. art. XCI (LEXIS 2010).
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may then declare the disability removed by declaration to the

Senate president and House speaker; however the chief justice
and a majority of the associate justices may send those officials
a counter-declaration insisting that the disability continues.
Were such a contest to occur, it would be up to the legislature to
assemble within forty-eight hours and, by a two-thirds majority
of each house, determine whether the governor's disability
continues. Should they fail to do so within twenty-one days, the
governor would resume office.7 6
The South Dakota and California constitutions are even
more vague. A 1972 amendment to the South Dakota
Constitution77 states only that "the Supreme Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine when a
continuous absence from the state or disability has occurred in
the office of the Governor." It provides no other detail or
provision as to who may suggest or declare such a disability or
what role a governor would have with respect to the Court's
deliberations. California's constitutional provision also offers
little detail, providing that "[t]he Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under this
section," and that "[s]tanding to raise questions of vacancy or
temporary disability is vested exclusively in a body provided by
statute."

V. THE VARYING

ROLES OF STATE SUPREME COURTS:
INVESTIGATE, DETERMINE, OR REVIEW

In several states (Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Maine,
Mississippi, New Hampshire) the high courts are tasked with an
investigatory role at the instigation of another body, an elected
official, or a group of elected officials. In four states (Illinois,
Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Utah) the court is permitted
or required to instigate the examination on its own volition.
Additionally, several other states give the supreme court sole
76. Id.
77. S.D. Const. art. IV, § 6 (LEXIS 2009).
78. Cal. Const. art. V, § 10 (LEXIS 2010); see also Cal. Gov. Code § 12058 (LEXIS
2010) (providing that succession to governorship upon gubernatorial disability shall be
according to statutorily established line of succession, but failing to address either process
of determining disability or who is to make determination).
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discretion to review its own prior determinations of disability
when determining if any disability has lapsed and whether the
governor removed may return to office. Such an assignment
gives the court the unenviable task of maintaining almost a
constant appraisal of the governor's health, rather than relying
upon the governor, the governor's counsel or staff, or even the
lieutenant governor to file papers with the court when the
governor has recovered instead.
The difficulty posed by such a process is that appellate
courts in general, and supreme courts in particular, are
adjudicatory rather than investigatory. Even in those cases in
which a state supreme court has original jurisdiction over a
matter it will often make use of special masters,7 9
commissioners,8 0 or others to contend with the examination of
documents, conduct hearings, and make initial determinations
and adjudications, subject to review by the court. While it is
possible that courts may take the position that they have an
inherent power to appoint individuals or panels to handle such
matters, in states like Georgia the court is specifically to take
testimony and conduct what amounts to a bench trial. Moreover,
in the case of those states where the supreme courts are
79. See e. g. In re Nettles-Nickerson, 750 N.W.2d 560 (Mich. 2008) (incorporating
recommendation of Judicial Tenure Commission that refers to findings and conclusions of
special master previously appointed by state Supreme Court); Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v.
City Council, 928 A.2d 1255, 1263-64 (Pa. 2007) (addressing statute that grants Supreme
Court power to name special master to hear certain matters related to casino gambling);
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 243 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Ark. 2006) (appointing

special masters to determine whether General Assembly and state Department of Education
had fulfilled requirements for school funding as established by prior order of state Supreme
Court); State ex rel. Sams v. Commr. of Correct., 625 S.E.2d 334, 336 (2005) (referring to

report of previously appointed special master regarding plans for transfer of prisoners from
local to state-controlled correctional facilities); Doe v. Bd. of Prof Resp., 104 S.W.3d 465,
468 (Tenn. 2003) (referring to appointment of special master in contempt proceeding
before Supreme Court); In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind. 2001) (referring to
appointment of special master to hear and take evidence regarding judge's conduct); In re
Lawrence, 520 S.E.2d 895, 895 (Ga. 1999) (referring to recommendation of special master
appointed to conduct ethics investigation of attorney).
80. See e.g. Stark v. Van Dam Floor Covering, Inc., 2008 Wash. LEXIS 53 (using

Supreme Court commissioner to determine attorneys fees and costs); Wis. Jud. Commn. v.
Ziegler (In re Ziegler), 750 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 2008) (describing "Judicial Conduct Panel"
appointed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.89 to conduct hearing with respect to conduct of
sitting Supreme Court justice prior to her election to that court); see also Thomas C.
Marvin, Ignore The Men Behind The Curtain: The Role of Commissioners In the Michigan

Supreme Court, 43 Wayne L. Rev. 375 (1997).
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permitted to be the initiators of the proceeding, they are placed
in the position of-at a minimum-collecting sufficient
evidence to commence a proceeding. Whereas in the
Blagojevich cases81 the Illinois Supreme Court could have
appointed a special master with the plenary power to operate
"under such rules as it may adopt" 8 with respect to
gubernatorial incapacity, it is not at all clear that other supreme
courts have such latitude.
VII. FORMS

OF "DISABILITY"

No standard definition of gubernatorial disability has been
established. In arguing that the Illinois Supreme Court should
remove Governor Blagojevich, for example, Illinois Attorney
General Madigan noted that the language of the Illinois
Constitution seems to suggest that "disability" is more expansive
than a matter of mental or physical ailment, 83 arguing that the
state constitution provides that a Governor shall be replaced if
"unable to serve because of death, conviction on im eachment,
failure to qualify, resignation, or other disability." She also
argued that "disability" as used in the Illinois constitution is
"unambiguous," 85 and pointed out that "disabled" can be found
to mean "unable, unfit, or disqualified." 86
81. Two Blagojevich cases were filed in the Illinois Supreme Court in 2008: One,
pressed by the state attorney general, sought (1) a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against the governor, and (2) leave to file an action to have the
governor declared unable to serve under Ill. Const. Art V, § 6(b) and Ill. S. Ct. R. 382,
which implements that constitutional provision. Both applications were denied. See People
v. Blagojevich, 2008 Ill. LEXIS 1824 (denying motion for leave to file complaint pursuant
to Ill. S. Ct. R. 382) & 2008 Ill. LEXIS 1822 (Dec. 17, 2008) (denying application for
restraining order and preliminary injunction). The other case, filed by three Illinois
taxpayers, called for the application of Ill. Const. Art. V, § 6(b) only. It too was dismissed.
See Bambenek v. Blagojevich, 2008 Ill. LEXIS 1823 (2008) (Dec. 17, 2008) (denying
motion for leave to file complaint to remove governor from office).
82. See nn. 70-71, supra, and accompanying text.
83. People v. Blagojevich, No. 107698, Brief in Support of Motion For Leave to File
Verified Complaint Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 382(a) (111., Dec. 12, 2008) at 10

(taking position that Illinois constitution "defines as a disability anything that renders the
Governor unable to serve regardless of the specific nature of that disability").
84. Id. (quoting Ill. Const. art. V., § 6(b)).
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 10 (citing Webster's dictionary). Indeed, the attorney general cited to "unfit"
several times, see id. at i, 9 ("Article V, §6(b) requires the removal of a Governor who is
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Other state constitutions vary in the level of specificity with
which they define the sort of disability that can result in the
supreme court's removal of the governor. Seven states specify
that either mental or physical disability or incapacity may serve
as the basis for removal. Reasons for removal in Alabama are
limited to "unsound mind," while Maine allows the legislature to
suggest the governor's mental or physical disability to the
Supreme Judicial Court, but allows the secretary of state to
suggest removal when he or she has any reason "to believe the
Governor is unable to discharge the duties of that office."
Mississippi allows removal for "protracted illness," possibly
covering both mental and physical ailments.
This distinction between specified disabilities and "other
disabilities" is crucial for the intervention of the supreme courts.
For example, in Alabama the lieutenant governor succeeds to the
governorship "in case of the governor's removal from office,
death or resignation," and "[i]n case of the impeachment of the
governor, his absence from the state for more than twenty days,
unsoundness of mind, or other disability."88 However, the
Supreme Court may only become involved if the "disability" in
question is "unsoundness of mind." 89 This limitation to
examinations of mental status alone may explain why no effort
was made to have Governor George Wallace removed after he
"unable" or "unfit" to serve"), 10 ("This common understanding of the term 'disability' in
§6(b)-something that makes one 'unable' or 'unfit' to serve-also comports with the
purpose of section 6 as a whole .... Thus, under Art. 5 §6(b), a disability is something that
renders an individual unfit or unable to serve as Governor."); id. at 12 ("The term [other
disability] must be given its plain meaning, which describes a Governor who is unable or
unfit to serve or who has been rendered incapable of proper and effective action."); 14
(asserting that "these unprecedented circumstances establish that Mr. Blagojevich is
'unable' and 'unfit' to serve effectively as Governor of the State of Illinois"). But it bears
noting that the term "unfit" is not universally deemed to be synonymous with the term
"unable." See e.g. U.S. Dept. of Defense, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2008)

at IV-123 (providing that "'[i]ncapacitated' means unfit or unable to perform properly,"
and indicating that "[a] person is 'unfit' to perform duties if at the time the duties are to
commence, the person is drunk, even though physically able to perform the duties," while
"[i]llness resulting from previous overindulgence is an example of being 'unable' to
perform duties.").
87. See Table 2, infra (containing summary information relating to procedures in each
of the states mentioned in this paragraph).
88. Ala. Const. art. V, §127 (LEXIS 2010).
89. Ala. Const. §128 (LEXIS 2010). Neither this section 128 nor section 127 specifies
who is to determine the "other disabilities" mentioned in section 127 or to decide when
they occur.
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was severely wounded and paralyzed in 1972, and he remained
in office until 1979.90
Most states use the term "disability" without specifying
whether it is limited to mental, physical or other impairments.
This becomes a critical distinction in those states where absence
from the state or some other activity (such as impeachment) may
serve as the basis for temporary removal. At a minimum, it
opens the possibility that a supreme court will have little to no
basis from which to draw upon when and if it must confront the
matter.
Table 2
Gubernatorial Disability Provisions Reviewable
by State Supreme Co rts
State
AL
CA

Mental
unsound mind

CO

mental disability

Physical

Absence
x

Other
impeachment.. .or
other temporary
disability

physical disability

unable to exercise
powers and

CT

perform duties

DE

FL
GA

IL

IN

unable to exercise
powers and perform
duties because of

unable to exercise
powers and perform
duties because of

mental disability

physical disability

during mental

during physical

incapacity

incapacity

unable to exercise
powers and perform
duties because of
mental disability

unable to exercise
powers and perform
duties because of
physical disability
unable to serve
because of death

unable to serve
because of
conviction on
impeachment,
failure to qualify,
resignation, or
other disability
unable to discharge
powers and duties

IA

unable to discharge
duties of office for
reason of disability

90. See e.g. Bellamy, supra n. 11, at 392 (citing Thomas S. Healey, The Two Deathsof
George Wallace 132-34 (Black Belt Press 1996)).
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State
KY

Table 2 (continued)
Gubernatorial Disability Provisions Reviewable
b State Supreme Courts
Absence
Physical
Mental
because of mental
incapacitation is
unable to discharge
duties of office

unable to discharge
powers and duties
of office

LA
ME

Other

because of physical
incapacitation is
unable to discharge
duties of office

for six months
continuously unable
to discharge duties
of office because of

for six months
continuously unable
to discharge duties of
office because of

mental disability

physical disability

unabletodischarg

ME 92

unable to discharge
duties of office

MD

Unable by reason of
mental disability to
perform duties of
office

Unable by reason of
physical disability to
perform duties of
office
unable to discharge
powers and duties
of office
suffering under an

MA
MI

inability

unable, from
protracted illness, to
perform duties of
office

MS

x

unable to discharge
power and duties of
office
unable to discharge
powers and duties
of office

MO
MN
NH

NJ

office "otherwise"
vacant

unable to discharge
power and duties of
office by reason of
mental incapacity
for six months been
continuously unable
to discharge duties
of office by reason

unable to discharge
power and duties of
office by reason of
physical incapacity
for six months been
continuously unable
to discharge duties of
office by reason of

of mental disability

physical disability

x
continued
for six
months

failed to qualify
within six months
after beginning
term of office, or
whenever

91. This provision is triggered by legislative action. See n. 27, supra, and
accompanying text.
92. This provisions is triggered by the Secretary of State's action. See n. 26, supra, and
accompanying text.
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Table 2 (continued)
Gubernatorial Disability Provisions Reviewable
by State Supreme Co rts
Absence
Physical
Mental

OH

Other

unable to discharge
duties of office by
reason of disability

OK

unable to discharge
powers and duties
of office

OR

unable to discharge
duties of the office

SD

x
continued

unable to serve by
reason other than
temporary
disability

disability

UT

VIII. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF THE HIGH COURTS

In sum, half of states provide for a process to temporarily
or permanently remove a governor through the intervention of
the state's supreme court or its chief justice. The placement of
such authority into the hands of the judiciary can be observed as
an extension of the courts' historic powers to review questions
of mental competency and physical capacity in other contexts.
However, such reviews are typically conducted at the trial level;
supreme courts, dealing mostly, if not exclusively, with
appellate proceedings, typically operate with a record from the
lower court that includes findings and conclusions as to the
capacity of the individual based upon medical and psychological
testimony as well as other evidence. Most supreme courts rarely
if ever take on the responsibility of conducting trials, gathering
and ruling on evidence, or holding prolonged hearings on a
single matter. In fact, the drafters of the 1901 Alabama
Constitution stated unequivocally, when considering procedures
for evaluation of gubernatorial disability, that they could
"conceive of no safer body, no more august body, no body less
liable to temptation to use the power for political gain or an
other improper motive, than the Supreme Court of Alabama."
While the courts of last resort may still be "safe", "august" and
93. Official Proceedings, supra n. 3, at 52.
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not liable to give in to the "temptation" to misuse their power, it
remains somewhat of an open question whether as an
institutional, structural, or procedural matter they remain the
best venue for such proceedings.

